

ARTICLE APPEARED
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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 October 1982

Former NSA chief Inman: 'We're far short of skills'

Washington

In a speech to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) last Oct. 4, Adm. Bobby R. Inman, the former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, lamented that the United States is not the world leader in intelligence gathering.

"We have some good organizations doing first class work," said Admiral Inman. "But for over 14 years, we drew down the size and cut back on the spending power."

"The education system failed to produce the people with the skills and the ability of linguists in area studies that would quickly give us the surge to deal with a whole range of burgeoning problems in the outside world," said the man who has long been regarded as one of America's most highly qualified intelligence officers.

"We did take advantage of new technology," the youthful-looking Inman told the former intelligence officers at their meeting in McLean, Va. "We're probably better at some things with regard to our principal adversary [the Soviet Union] than we've ever been before. But in a troubled outside world, we're far short of the skills and trained manpower, that we're going to need for the coming decade...."

Inman declared that the Soviet Union was undergoing a leadership change and that the US knows far less than it should about those who are likely to rise to power in Moscow. He said that the Soviet ability to project air and naval power around the world had increased markedly and that this added a further element of worry.

The new leaders, the admiral said, "may be as cautious as their predecessors."

"But one must face the bleak fact that there is at least as much prospect that they will be more arrogant, without the same memories of the Germans on the banks of the Volga and [at] Leningrad — and more inclined to use that unparalleled power in ways inimical to the vital interests of this country."

In a Monitor interview, Inman added that, looking back, he realized a failing in US intelligence's analysis of the Soviet leadership. The error, he said, was in trying to divide those leaders along the lines that resemble American "hawks" and "doves."

Inman, who once headed the supersecret National Security Agency, the largest of the American intelligence agencies, said in his speech that the administration had put together a long-range plan that will add "substantial people and substantial dollars" to the intelligence agencies. But he added that sustaining support for that plan "is not going to be easy."

Inman announced at the AFIO meeting that he was resigning as a volunteer consultant to the Permanent Committee on Intelligence in the House of Representatives. His resignation was sparked by a report which one of its subcommittee chairmen, Rep. Charles Rose (D) of North Carolina, issued last month raising the possibility that high-level intelligence officers had done some political tinkering with intelligence reporting on Central America to make it fit Reagan administration preconceptions. Inman said that the subcommittee report had been issued on a partisan basis. The subcommittee's ranking minority member, C. W. Bill Young, a Republican from Florida, called it a "self-serving report" which could be shown to be biased.

CONTINUED

ARTICLE APPENDED
ON PAGE 1THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 October 1982

AMERICA'S SPIES

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

"The Soviets," says the bespectacled round-faced man who looks more like a stockbroker than America's top spy, "got virtually a free ride on all of our research and development."

He's talking about secret agents — from the Soviet bloc. And, he says, they plundered America's technological secrets because our own spies weren't watching them.

The speaker is William C. Casey, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and coordinator for all intelligence gathering for the United States. He indicates that things are likely to become much tougher for the Soviets in the world's intensifying spy wars if he has his way.

After years of controversy and cutback, America's spies are finally getting a break.

The Reagan administration is putting more money and manpower into the business of spying, and into countering Soviet bloc spies both at home and abroad.

Exact figures on recruiting for the spy trade and on the money spent on the intelligence agencies are kept secret. But it is clear that after years of decline, spying is now a "growth industry." One of the few government institutions which is hiring new employees in this time of recession is the US Central Intelligence Agency.

In the view of some experts, the effort comes none too soon.

"We've got to strengthen HUMINT," says one of the experts who has access to sensitive intelligence reports, speaking in the peculiar argot of professional spies. He means "human intelligence gathering".

"Our SIGINT (signal intelligence) and photo intelligence are among the best, but in HUMINT . . . we're lucky if we're among the top 10."


The Reagan administration took power some 21 months ago determined to strengthen intelligence collection, analysis, and operations, and the dozen agencies that make up what is known in the trade as the "intelligence community" are benefiting.

Take the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example. According to one high-ranking intelligence officer, FBI money and manpower was once stretched to the point where the bureau had to stop surveillance of certain known Soviet spies, who, together with European surrogate spies, were operating in an increasingly sophisticated and aggressive manner in this country.

The FBI has become increasingly concerned over the loss to Soviet spies of American high technology information. Although precise figures are closely guarded, it is now clear that the FBI is getting more in way of resources to conduct a more aggressive counterespionage program.

Mr. Casey argues, however, that the intelligence agencies are not so much increasing their budgets as they are building back to where they were before they got cut during the 1970s.

In a more than hour-long interview with the Monitor, Casey said that because of these cuts in money and manpower, intelligence reporting on an increasingly turbulent third world and on a variety of other problems had been drastically reduced. According to Casey, major intelligence analyses, known as "national estimates" often failed to cover third world developments.



US intelligence: focus on the Kremlin, third world countries

Opening the "Trapdoor Knapsack"

An Israeli mathematician cracks a formidable code

Five years ago, computer scientists at Stanford and M.I.T. made a pair of chummy but keenly competitive \$100 bets. A team at each university had devised a secret code to protect computers from electronic intruders by scrambling and unscrambling the data in a complex fashion. Each team offered cash to the first mathematician who could crack its code, figuring that the deciphering could not be done in much less than a million years. To the surprise of all concerned, however, the Stanford scheme sprang a leak this year, putting \$100 in the pocket of a determined young Israeli theoretician

pert in the branch of mathematics known as complexity theory. Shamir was at M.I.T. in the late '70s as an associate professor of mathematics, and in fact helped write the M.I.T. code that competes head-on with Stanford's. Last spring, back in his spartan, second-floor office in the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot, the lean, blue-jeaned mathematician settled the old wager: he found a way to unravel the original Stanford system. The code Shamir broke after four years of hard work was no Buck Rogers-Dick Tracy cipher. It was a charter member, along with the M.I.T. code, of


separate keys for every combination of sender and receiver. One thousand users require nearly half a million keys. In 1976 Merkle and two other researchers at Stanford, Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie, attacked the unwieldy problem of key distribution. In one of the cleverest shortcuts in modern cryptography, they replaced the single key used in conventional schemes with two separate keys related only by a complex and deliberately dense mathematical formula.

Electronic mailboxes can be set up with two keys for each subscriber to the system. Dick Tracy, should he choose to subscribe, would select his own two keys, much as a bank will permit customers to choose their own cash-machine passwords. If Buck Rogers wants to send Dick Tracy a secret communication, he simply looks up Dick's public encoding key in a directory and uses it to garble his message. No one without access to Dick's secret decoding key, not even Buck himself, can read the resulting scramble of letters and numbers.

In Israel, Shamir challenged a version of this dual-key scheme. The Stanford code, based on a conundrum known among mathematicians as the "trapdoor knapsack," was thought to be so fiendishly complex that even the world's most powerful computers could not crack it. But Shamir proved otherwise. Exploiting recent advances in an obscure branch of number theory, he bore into the trapdoor knapsack system and revealed that the secret decoder could in fact be unraveled by analysis of the encoder that was published. "I was sitting alone staring at the wallboard on which some equations were written," he recalls. "Suddenly everything fell into place, all the pieces. I saw the missing links and I knew just what to do." Insists Lee Segel, head of Weizmann's faculty of mathematical sciences: "He kicked the competition in the teeth."

The public-key concept may survive Shamir's master stroke. Secret codes, like fine wines, tend to improve with age. The competing code system Shamir co-authored at M.I.T. remains, for the moment, uncracked. But the discovery of so basic a flaw in the Stanford scheme is no small matter. When public-key codes first started appearing in scientific journals, Admiral Bobby Inman, then head of the National Security Agency and until recently deputy director of the CIA, worried in public about the Soviets' and other hostile nations' learning to develop uncrackable codes simply by studying published U.S. encryption work. But that fear may have been misdirected: on the contrary, the real security problem for the electronic age may be that no computer can be made completely safe from intruders determined to break in. —By Phillip Feltick

Reported by Russell Lewis (Los Angeles and Martin Lewis, Jerusalem)



and raising troublesome, and potentially costly, questions about whether computers can ever be made to keep their secrets.

In the past, such a breakthrough in cryptography might have mattered only to a few hundred cryptanalysts and a handful of spies. Today, however, the demonstration of a code's vulnerability inevitably has worrisome implications for the way banks and multinational firms do business. Consider the stakes: the U.S. banking system alone moves some \$400 billion by computer around the country every day; yet many banks pump money onto the wires and over satellite networks with little or no encryption, or coding, at all. Predicts Mathematician Ralph Merkle, a member of the Stanford codemaking team: "One of these days someone will break into a wire-transfer banking network and siphon off all the contents. Then there will be a lot of interest in cryptography."

The Stanford coding system was cracked by Dr. Shamir, 30, an Israeli

the new "public key" family of encryption schemes, so called because one of their secret code words, or keys, can be made public without giving anything away.

Most codes have only one key, usually a string of letters or numerals, that determines how a piece of plain text is to be scrambled and unscrambled. By permitting their key to be openly published, the new codes have a great advantage over all conventional message scramblers, including the popular Data-Encryption Standard (DES) code, developed by IBM and endorsed by the National Bureau of Standards. To send one message with a DES code requires at least two separate transmissions: one to send the coded text and another to send the secret key that unlocks it. "The big problem in data encryption is managing the keys," says one executive in charge of computer security. "That's the thing that drives people crazy." With a large electronic mail system, in which users send each other notes by computer, each user sending coded messages needs

ASSOCIATED PRESS
22 October 1982LITTLE EVIDENCE SEEN IN SALVADOR CERTIFICATIONS
By ROBERT PARRY
WASHINGTON

The Reagan administration has little investigative evidence to support its contention that El Salvador's government is making a "concerted and significant effort" to respect human rights, according to U.S. officials and a House report.

These sources say U.S. intelligence agencies, which dug up volumes of information on leftist guerrilla activity, have paid scant attention to the government's alleged role in rightist death squads or to charges that Salvadoran troops fire on non-combatants.

CIA defenders say the reason for the lack of information on the right was the shortage of intelligence "assets" and the need to devote them to study the leftist insurgency.

"You go back to the '79-80 time frame, the answer is that there were almost no assets, and then as the assets were built up, they were concentrated on what was judged to be the highest priority problem," the leftist revolt, said retired Adm. Bobby R. Inman, who stepped down as deputy CIA director in June.

Others cited rules that bar U.S. military advisers from going with Salvadoran troops into combat areas where killing of non-combatants has allegedly occurred. In various interviews, Green Beret advisers said their knowledge was based on what the Salvadoran troops told them.

But a House intelligence committee staff report issued last month suggests the "dearth of firm information" on El Salvador's right-wing death squads stems from a lack of interest among U.S. policymakers and intelligence analysts.

The report said that when documents on rightist activity were captured from former Maj. Roberto D'Aubuisson in 1980, they were "virtually ignored not only by policymakers ... but more importantly by the intelligence community."

The documents, including arms lists and a log of meetings, were seized when D'Aubuisson and other rightists were arrested and charged with plotting a coup. The House report said that after the documents were turned over to the CIA, "their whereabouts is unknown."

The CIA has refused comment on the House report. D'Aubuisson is now head of El Salvador's Constituent Assembly.

About 38,000 people _ mostly unarmed civilians _ have died in the political violence that has ravaged El Salvador the past three years. Some human rights groups blame government forces and right-wing paramilitary groups for up to 80 percent of the killings. Few of the murders are investigated.

CONTINUED

World

Salvador data lacking: report

WASHINGTON [AP]—Despite twice certifying human rights progress in El Salvador, the Reagan administration has done little to investigate allegations that Salvadoran security forces have killed thousands of unarmed civilians, according to U.S. officials and a House report.

These sources say U.S. intelligence agencies have developed scant information on the government's alleged involvement with rightist death squads and charges that Salvadoran troops fire on noncombatants during sweeps through the countryside.

But while there is a general consensus on the lack of information, the reasons suggested for it vary.

Some say scarce intelligence resources had to be devoted to studying the leftist insurgency. Others cite the ban on U.S. military advisers going with troops into combat areas

and the difficulty of assessing criminal cases in another country.

Still others suggest the administration does not want information that could embarrass the U.S.-backed government.

RETIRED ADM. Bobby R. Inman, who stepped down as deputy CIA director in June, said the absence of intelligence on the right resulted from a decision to concentrate the few U.S. intelligence "assets" in El Salvador on the actions of leftist guerrillas.

"You go back to the '79-'80 time frame, the answer is that there were almost no assets, and then as the assets were built up, they were concentrated on what was judged to be the highest priority problem"—the guerrilla threat, Inman said in an interview.

However, a House intelligence committee staff report issued last month claims the "dearth of firm information" on El Salvador's right-wing death squads stems from an apparent lack of interest among U.S. policymakers and intelligence analysts.

The report noted that when documents on rightist activity were captured from former Maj. Roberto D'Aubuisson in 1980, they were "virtually ignored not only by policymakers . . . but more importantly by the intelligence community."

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ARTICLE APPEARED
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20 OCTOBER 1982

'Author exposes mysteries of secret agency'

Author James Bamford discusses his quest for information on the super-secret National Security Agency.

The National Security Agency, or NSA, is probably the most secret agency in the United States Government. Created not by public law but by a presidential directive which remains classified to this day, the NSA has been remarkably successful in remaining hidden in the shadows while such agencies as the CIA and the FBI have been subjected to public scrutiny.

The agency must maintain anonymity because the NSA is the codebreaking arm of the United States, and intercepting coded messages relies on the transmitter believing that no one is listening. Employing huge, high-speed computers which are at least five years in advance of the commercial state-of-the-art, the NSA intercepts vast numbers of messages flying through the atmosphere between embassies and foreign ministries, ships at sea and their headquarters, even the private conversations of foreign leaders.

NSA also probably intercepts thousands of ordinary telephone, telex and telegraphic communications that travel in and out of the United States. Thus, NSA has a vast capacity for the invasion of privacy, probably greater than the FBI or the CIA.

In his book, "The Puzzle Palace," author James Bamford is the first person to rip away, at least partially, the shroud of secrecy surrounding NSA. In a one-hour interview with Washington Times reporter John A. Barnes, Bamford described how he pierced the wall of secrecy surrounding the NSA.

Q: How has the NSA been able to maintain its total anonymity for so long without anybody looking into it, as happened with the CIA?

A: The birth of the two agencies themselves was entirely different. The CIA was formed by public law in 1947, it has a public charter detailing what it can do. There was no secret about the establishment of the CIA.

The NSA, on the other hand, in 1952 was established by a top secret presidential memorandum which is still secret. In fact, there were two lawsuits in 1975 and 1976 seeking to have it declassified. The NSA won the lawsuits, keeping every last word of the seven-page memorandum secret.

It's always been amazing to me why nobody picked up on the NSA. I'm in Boston and I always had a big interest in NSA right from the beginning. I did most of my work commuting back and forth between Boston and Washington and it always amazed me why people in the news media in Washington full-time, who are always looking for a good story, never did a little work and come up with some decent stories on the NSA. The material was there.

Q: Do you think perhaps it is because the CIA tends to hire more talented writers, who, when they get out, write books about their experiences?

A: Exactly. CIA sources are almost a dime-a-dozen in Washington. You have so many of them. There are the "pro" people like Colby and going all the way back to Dulles, former directors and other high officials, and then you have the "anti" people like Philip Agee, Sneed and so forth who have left the agency and written books about it. And there are a few independent people around who have written about it.

But the NSA has never had that problem, they have never had an employee turned author, either pro or con. One of the reasons for that is because of the laws. There are far more restrictive laws in writing about the NSA than there are about writing about the CIA. There is a little known law, Public Law 86-36, which says that no law will be interpreted as to require the NSA to divulge any information about its organization, function, structure, personnel, salaries, etcetera. In other words, if you ask for any information about NSA other than its name, you will get back a letter stating that under

this law, we are not required to divulge this information. The CIA doesn't have that. That's why they have such a backlog of Freedom of Information Act requests.

Q: You would think that the CIA would lobby for similar protection.

A: They have, they just haven't gotten very far. NSA, in fact, has a law which is about the closest America has ever come to an Official Secrets Act, and that's Title 18, Section 798 of the United States Code. And what that is is the SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) Statute. So if you're at CIA and want to write about intelligence operations, there's really no law preventing that.

But with the NSA, just writing about SIGINT, well, that's 10 years in jail. The key to that law is that the information has to be stamped "Classified: Communications Intelligence." I got around that law by writing my book entirely from public sources.

Q: So all the material in your book was gathering dust on shelves, basically?

A: Yes, but I had to use some ingenuity to obtain material from NSA. I had to find an exception to that Public Law 86-36 and I found it in the NSA's in-house newsletter. I was going through some old files in Lexington, Va. and found a copy of the NSA newsletter. Now that in itself wouldn't have been such a big deal because I would have written the NSA and said 'Send me copies of all your newsletters going back to 1952' and they just would have used law 86-36 to say no.

But they made one big mistake in that newsletter and that was that they had a little paragraph in it which said, "The contents of this newsletter should be kept within a small circle of NSA employees and their families." By putting those last three words in there my argument was that they had opened it up to the world, to people outside of NSA. No security clearance,

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM The Joel Spivak Show STATION WRC Radio

DATE October 12, 1982 11:06 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Boris Korczak

JOEL SPIVAK: In a few minutes I will introduce you to a man who claims that he was a double agent and that the Russians are trying to kill him. They haven't succeeded, because he's sitting here with me. And I will introduce you to him in just a few minutes.

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SPIVAK: The Dossier magazine, which usually has pictures of society matrons and people like that, is an unlikely place to pick up a story like this. But we noticed a little blurb in the Dossier about a man by the name of Boris Korczak. Boris Korczak claims that he was a double agent, working not only for the KGB, but for the Central Intelligence Agency, and that -- well, he's sitting right here. I might as well let him tell you.

How long have you been in this country?

BORIS KORCZAK: I came 2 1/2 years ago to the United States.

SPIVAK: Under what circumstances?

KORCZAK: Since Christmas Eve 1979. And I've been looking really for this, what was promised to me by CIA, some kind of a security umbrella, since my cover was blown, you know, Christmas Eve 1979, and the CIA promised me to cover my expenses to resettle, free transportation, citizenship.

SPIVAK: Where were you at the time? You were in

Europe? Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250003-6

STATINTL

Some heads begin to roll

A great many Washington heads were expected to roll after the Nov. 2 election, in keeping with what has become a mid-term tradition for troubled administrations, but this week finds a number of heads already underfoot.

Republican National Chairman Richard Richards surprised many by announcing he will leave his post in January. The surprise was not at his departure—the Reagan administration has been increasingly unhappy with Mr. Richards' inability to improve GOP fortunes this fall—but at his timing.

It was rather like General Eisenhower announcing on the eve of Normandy that he was going to step down after the invasion. Except that Mr. Richards is no Eisenhower and Nov. 2 is more likely to be a Democratic Normandy than a Republican one.

Mr. Richards did show a certain lack of subtlety in publicly writing off such voting groups as blacks and environmentalists, claiming that black leaders were all Democrats and that the environment was not an issue when polls showed that most Americans want the environment protected. But in fairness, he

did nothing more than hew to the White House party line, as when he said: "Sure we have some economic problems, but nobody blames them on us." A reasonable suspicion is that Mr. Richards has announced his departure now rather than becoming a scapegoat and having it announced for him on Nov. 3. If the election falls to the Democrats as heavily as even the White House now fears, someone else will have to be found to play that sacrificial part.

The resignation of Robert Nimmo as President Reagan's administrator of the Veterans Administration was little lamented. Many thought that his continuing insensitivity to the problems of Viet-Nam War veterans—he has accused the veterans of always demanding "more and more"—pointed toward his ouster some time ago.

But his undoing was largely brought about by a soon-to-be-released General Accounting Office report attacking him for wanton indulgence in chauffeured cars, first-class air travel, charter of military aircraft, expensive redecorating and other unauthorized perks.

One departure much to be regretted is that of retired Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, former director of the National Security Agency and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who announced his resignation as a consultant to the House Intelligence Committee.

His complaint was that the Democratic-controlled committee was too partisan in overseeing intelligence activities. A major factor in his departure from the CIA was the political leadership of Director William Casey, formerly President Reagan's campaign manager.

The loss of Admiral Inman is unfortunate not only as evidence of the politicizing of the intelligence services. His extraordinary skills, high principles and dispassionate judgment made him perhaps the most respected name in the intelligence community. His is one head our government can ill afford to lose.

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EVIDENCE OF MILITARY BUILDUP IN NICARAGUA

STATINTL

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ON PAGE 18

VILLAGE VOICE
19 OCTOBER 1982

PRESS CLIPS

By Alexander Cockburn

El Salvador: Press and Intelligence

I hear—with good reason—much lamentation about the marked diminution in energetic and informative coverage of events in El Salvador, now that *New York Times* correspondent Ray Bonner has been recalled to 43rd Street and a stint on the business pages. As loud as the lamentation but more discordant is speculation about why exactly Bonner was recalled. Among the reasons suggested:

- Tom Enders demanded his head.
- It was a trade-off between Bonner and Friedman in Beirut. One or the other had to go.
- Bonner had never gone through the proper journalistic-bureaucratic hoops, and the moment when he had to come back to New York for hoop-jumping could no longer be postponed.

I'd incline to the last theory myself, by reason of general plausibility, but short of causing a lie detector needless pain by affixing it to A.M. Rosenthal, how can one ever know for sure?

It could not be said that Bernard Weinraub, Bonner's brief successor, performed with great distinction. Correspondents will now be more rapidly rotated, which presumably means that no one will ever be there long enough to learn the facts, and consequently each novice will reduplicate Weinraub's astonishing parroting a couple of Sunday's ago of US Embassy agitprop. The State Department must be feeling well satisfied, all the more so given this *Times* article towards the end of September succumbing without a struggle to the long-pressed but never proven Nicaragua/supply line theory.

Anyone seeking useful material on the monitoring of events in El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, Nicaragua, should make every effort to obtain the staff report of the House Intelligence Committee's subcommittee on oversight and evaluation, entitled "U.S. Intelligence Performance on Central America", and made public—a very rare event—on September 22.

This was the report that prompted former CIA Deputy director Admiral Bobby Inman's resignation as consultant to the committee last week. Inman charged that it was a political document, by which he presumably meant an effort to present the administration and other sponsors of US intervention in El Salvador in a bad light.

Inman is right, but the allocation of bad light is thoroughly deserved. The 23-page report, duly but briefly noted in the newspapers when it was published, is a devastating indictment of US intelligence. It also exonerates journalists who were harshly under attack at various times as being dupes or worse of the International Communist Conspiracy.

The report notes that Edward Boland, chairman of the Intelligence Committee, issued a press release last March 4, acknowledging "concerns" about Nicaragua's responsibility in supplying and training the Salvadoran guerrillas and providing them sanc-

tuaries from which to prosecute the war. But six pages later, in decorous language, the report suggests that the briefing which gave rise to the March 4 press release, so satisfactory to Alexander Haig, was often bullshit.

It seems that staffers followed the oral briefing with written questions to which answers from the CIA and elsewhere were unsatisfactory. In the oral briefing it was stated that "lots of ships have been traced" from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua. The written response showed few examples. In the oral briefing it was maintained that "You don't plan an operation like what is being run in El Salvador if you haven't gone to somebody's command and general staff college." It turned out this statement did not mean that the guerrillas had been trained in Moscow, but was merely a figure of speech.

The report discusses at length the fact that intelligence about the right as opposed to the left in El Salvador has been abysmal. A mid-1980 intelligence study conceded "there is scant intelligence on right-wing terrorist organization membership and the groups' relationship to each other, to the wealthy elite, or to the military."

The report asks why intelligence about the Salvadoran right was and is poor, and, eschewing the obvious response that it does not always pay to look under your own bed, remarks that the intelligence agencies "have simply not considered the subject of Salvadoran rightist violence as a target for collection.... In recent years the limited collection resources of CIA have been devoted almost exclusively to the insurgency...."

In one grimly humorous section, the report traces the history of a set of documents obtained in May or June of 1980 by the US embassy in El Salvador when Roberto D'Aubuisson was arrested and charged with plotting a coup. The documents included logs of meetings, expenditures, and arms lists with references to silencers and other equipment, along with names and addresses of rightist Salvadoran businessman.

US Ambassador Robert White sent a copy of the principal document to State and gave the set to the local CIA chief of station. Committee staffers discovered that the CIA never analysed the documents, nor could any record or analysis of them be found at CIA HQ. DIA never received or analysed the documents. State Department policymakers made no use of the documents, though apprised of them by White. State's own intelligence arm, INR, told the Intelligence Committee staffers that it had heard "rumors" of such documents, had been looking "high and low" for them, and, as the report dryly notes, "asked the staff to notify them if it should locate the documents. The staff was soon able to do so, having learned that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published the documents... in April, 1981.... During the two years since their capture, these documents had been virtually ignored not only by policymakers... but more importantly by the intelligence community...." You can see why Inman resigned after reading the report.

Continuing its devastating path, the report demonstrates that US intelligence attempts to refute the observations of Philippe Bourgois about a Salvadoran army massacre were "misleading" and self-admitted efforts to present

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 8HUMAN EVENTS
16 OCTOBER 1982

Democrats Play Politics On Intelligence Committee

Democratic members of the House Intelligence Committee have come in for strong criticism for authorizing the release of a controversial staff report critical of U.S. intelligence performance in Central America.

Denounced as politically biased and sloppy by intelligence experts in this country, the report has been nevertheless exploited by the Cubans in their radio broadcasts in an effort to convince foreign audiences that the CIA and the Reagan Administration have been covering up right-wing terrorism in El Salvador.

But what makes the criticism of the Intelligence Committee extremely important is the fact that the former deputy director of both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency, Adm. Bobby Inman, resigned his position as a consultant to the committee after the report was made public.

Inman, a darling of the liberals who is usually described as "one of the nation's top intelligence experts," denounced the report as "seriously flawed," saying it was "put out on party lines." He said that intelligence "shouldn't be a party issue" and that "If this country doesn't establish a bipartisan approach to intelligence we are not going to face the problems of the next 50 years."

The staff report was requested by Rep. Charles Rose (D-N.C.), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation of the Intelligence Committee, who is involved in a tough battle for re-election in North Carolina's 7th District against conservative Republican Ed Johnson.

In an apparent effort to embarrass the Administration and grab headlines, Rep. Rose and fellow Democrats on the committee decided September 22 to release the report over the objections of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA.)

Although the decision to make the report public was made at a secret session of the full committee, Rep. Bill Young (R.-Fla.), the ranking Republican member of the committee, has revealed that all of the minority members objected to its release. This would include Kenneth Robinson (Va.), Robert McClosky (Ill.), William Whitehurst (Va.), as well as Bob Stump (Ariz.), who recently switched his party affiliation from Democratic to Republican.

Rep. Rose has said the report "certainly represents my views and, I would say, the views of the majority," which would include Edward Boland (Mass.), the chairman of the committee, Norman Mineta (Calif.), Lee Hamilton (Ind.), Albert Gore Jr. (Tenn.), Clement Zablocki (Wis.), Romano Mazzoli (Ky.) and Wyche Fowler (Ga.).

Stories about the report were generated in both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, with Rep. Rose being quoted as saying that it demonstrated the need for the U.S. intelligence agencies to retain their "independence" and not be "manipulated" by the Administration.

But Rep. Young's devastating critique of the report has not generated similar coverage.

Inserted into the October 1 *Congressional Record*, the critique described the report as "slanted and unfair," saying that its four specific criticisms of the intelligence agencies "turn out to be either petty and minor or a misunderstanding of the data by the staff authors of the report."

For instance, the report criticizes a CIA official for having told the Intelligence Committee that "lots of ships have been traced" from the Soviet Union through various countries to Nicaragua, when, in fact, the CIA could only show "a very few examples."

The critique asks, "How many are 'many.' How few are 'few'?" The point, of course, is that arms are flowing from the Soviet Union through other countries to Nicaragua."

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STATINTL

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-11

THE WASHINGTON TIMES
15 OCTOBER 1982

Democrats playing with U.S. intelligence

When retired Adm. Bobby Inman blew the whistle recently on the House Committee on Intelligence for playing partisan politics in its evaluation of American intelligence in Central America, his reputation as the quintessential professional lent weight to his warning that congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies "has to be bi-partisan."

The danger that the impartial congressional watchdogs appointed to insure the integrity of the intelligence process can be transformed by partisanship into quarreling pit terriers at each others' throats is dramatized by the incident that caused Inman to resign his consultancy with the House committee and to go public with his sharp criticism.

By a straight 9-5 party line vote, the Democratic majority in the House committee forced the public

release of a staff report on intelligence coverage in El Salvador and Nicaragua. In the words of Rep. Charles Rose D-N.C., the chairman of the subcommittee that prepared the study, this publicity was essential because of the danger that the CIA might otherwise be "coopted by the policy makers at the White House."

Claiming only to be interested in preserving the objectivity of the intelligence community against interference by the Reagan administration, the anonymous staffers who wrote the report note instances where the intelligence reporting has been guilty in their judgment of "tendentious rhetoric, occasional oversimplification and misstatement." This bitter pill is presumably made easier for the intelligence agencies to swallow by assurances that in general the intelligence has been good in spite of administration pressures.

Appearing just six weeks before a national election, this staff report

contains useful ammunition for liberal Democrats in districts where the Reagan administration's policy in Central America has become a major issue. There is the clear implication here that the administration has deliberately tried to slant the intelligence estimates in order to exaggerate the extent of Castro's intervention and has played down right wing terror.

Reacting sharply, the Republican minority on the House Intelligence Committee has fired back with "A Critique of the Staff Study" introduced into the *Congressional Record* by Rep. C.W. Bill Young R-Fla. In a point by point refutation, the critique purports to prove the majority report "to be extremely biased, containing overstatements, misstatements and subjective generalities."

This exchange of veiled insults between the Democratic and Republican members and staff of the House committee shows how quickly the introduction of partisan politics into the oversight process can destroy its utility. With no access to the secret intelligence on which these conflicting views are based, the general public can only rely on the apolitical testimony of someone like Adm. Inman who has reviewed all the evidence. His conclusion is clear that the staff report released by the Democratic majority is "seriously flawed" and politically partisan.

On the chance that both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees can learn from this case to avoid partisan infighting in the future, it is worth reviewing the extent of real damage that has already been done.

First, Fidel Castro moved quickly to exploit a unique opportunity, Radio Havana's international service of

Oct. 4th carried a gloating description of how the House Intelligence Committee had found the CIA guilty of presenting "a false picture" of the real situation in El Salvador "in order to support Reagan's policy." For months to come, the staff report will provide invaluable grist for Castro's propaganda mills, while disheartening our democratic allies with the spectacle of an America at cross purposes with itself.

Another casualty of this episode is the relationship of mutual trust that existed between CIA analysts and the congressional committees. When Senate staffers recently attempted to set up a briefing on Central America, they found intelligence officials very reluctant to engage in frank discussion. These officials bitterly resented the fact that information they had given the House committee had been selectively misused. They felt they had been "sandbagged" by anonymous staffers and had no way of defending themselves because of the highly classified nature of the evidence.

Finally, this politicization of congressional oversight has led senior Reagan officials to seriously question whether the U.S. government is any longer capable of responding to Soviet probes with covert action programs of any significance. Under present law, both intelligence committees have to be informed of any plan to provide secret support to friends and allies abroad. There is increasing doubt whether this clearance procedure can be relied on, if there seems to be any political advantage in leaking the plan in order to destroy it.

Since there is wide agreement that some form of congressional oversight is essential to keep the intelligence agencies honest, there is growing interest in replacing the two existing committees with a single joint committee with a highly professional staff like the old Joint Atomic Energy Committee. It may be the only way to save congressional oversight from self-destruction.

CORD MEYER

Democrats protest spy activities

The former deputy CIA director, Bobby R. Inman, says Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee are protesting elements of the Reagan administration's high-priority drive to expand covert actions abroad.

Although no one disclosed what covert actions were protested, Inman's statement is the first time any ranking member of the U.S. intelligence community has suggested that an oversight committee has made a series of objections about ongoing operations.

ASSOCIATED PRESS
14 OCTOBER 1982

By ROBERT PARRY

WASHINGTON

The former deputy CIA director, Bobby R. Inman, intelligence committee are protesting elements of the high-priority drive to expand covert actions abroad.

In an interview with The Associated Press, Inman underlying reason the committee voted along party line staff report criticizing U.S. intelligence-gathering in Central America.

Committee officials promptly rejected Inman's claim that disputes over covert action colored the report, saying the staff members who wrote the critique were not even involved in reviewing covert activities.

Although no one disclosed what covert actions were protested, Inman's statement is the first time any ranking member of the U.S. intelligence community has suggested that an oversight committee has made a series of objections about ongoing operations.

Inman said the committee Democrats have written letters to President Reagan critical of CIA covert actions. He said he believed some of those letters were critical of actions in Central America. Published reports have said Reagan approved a covert action plan for Central America last fall.

Only one critical letter had previously come to light. In July 1981, sources said the committee complained about a plan directed against the radical government of Libya's Moammar Khadafy.

Inman said it was just such protest letters that sparked his concern.

"What really troubles me is that here in the oversight process they have let sharply different views about covert action creep into what appears to be a critique on substantive intelligence," Inman said. "That's what really lies underneath the split and the criticism."

Inman, who resigned as an unpaid consultant to the committee because of the report, also complained that the 23-page document reflected a bias against U.S. policy in Central America.

He also complained that it failed to say a key House briefing on alleged outside control of the Salvadoran insurgency was given by operational officials "deeply enmeshed" in covert actions, not by intelligence analysts.

Inman, a retired Navy admiral who stepped down as deputy CIA director June 10, said this distinction should have been made because these "operational personnel" are less analytical and less objective than "substantive intelligence people."

However, in a statement issued late Thursday, Rep. Charles Rose, D-N.C., chairman of the Intelligence oversight subcommittee, said only two of 18

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Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901FARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A 26NEW YORK TIMES
6 October 1982

Science's Open Secret

The quest for knowledge is necessarily an open process, and national security requires secrecy. Hence an inevitable tension between scientists and security officials. But that tension has recently turned into frank hostility. In the latest of several imbroglios, the organizers of a laser-optics conference last month were compelled by guardians of military secrets to withdraw a quarter of the papers they planned to hear.

Now the National Academy of Sciences has responsibly addressed the problem. Although it essentially supports the scientists' side of the argument, it should help heal the breach.

When the Soviet physicist L.I. Rudakov toured the United States a few years ago giving lectures on fusion energy research, American security officials followed him with warnings that his remarks were classified as secret. Such zealotry occurs, and the dangers should be obvious. But misjudgments in the opposite direction are harder to prove. Much militarily valuable technical information does pass from West to East. The essential question is how much of this leakage results from open communication among scientists.

The Academy committee, which had access to secrets, examined the known cases of leakage and reports being shown "no documented examples that were the direct result of open scientific communication." Even if some leakage did so occur, it seems minuscule compared with the losses attributable to Soviet spying or legal purchases of equipment.

The committee is right to conclude that scien-

tific inquiry should remain open except in cases directly involving military secrets; the costs — to scientific and technical advance — of even a small step toward censorship would be too high. Specifically, it warned against extending the Export Administration Regulations to university research, as security officials have tried to do.

But the committee notes the view of Adm. Bobby Inman, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, that university research may become a more serious target of Soviet interest as other technology leaks are cut off. The intensity of the Soviet collection effort is not fully recognized by scholars; an army of 100,000 sleuths, says the Academy, is translating and disseminating American data published by the Commerce Department.

Whether such research is easily turned into military advantages is open to question. Soviet weapons designers are so conservative and compartmentalized that they are slow to adopt innovations. Security controls can never do more than slow the rate at which American information is lost, and the Soviet Union's internal arrangements may be the best available protection.

What needs above all to be recognized is that America's preeminence in military technology has much to do with its preeminence in civilian research. And that depends mightily on the ability of American scientists to communicate among themselves and with scientists abroad. The vitality of American science and technology is the practical as well as philosophical priority. It requires a maximum of communication, for which the occasional leak is a small price to pay.

National and International News in Brief

National



Bobby Ray Inman

An intelligence expert quits his post with a 'partisan' House panel.

Retired Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, who held some of the nation's most sensitive intelligence posts, accused the House Intelligence Committee of partisanship and resigned as a consultant to the panel. On Monday, Inman said he quit because he was not consulted before the committee issued a report last month on U.S. intelligence activities in Central America. "I found the report seriously flawed," he said, and added that its conclusions reflected "party lines." The report praised U.S. intelligence-gathering, while noting "certain weaknesses" in the analysis of the data. Inman retired in April as deputy director of both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the

report covered some areas for which he was responsible during his tenure at the CIA. A committee spokesman said the panel did not consult him because "it would be unusual to ask him to consult on matters under his own stewardship."

THE WASHINGTON POST
5 OCTOBER 1982ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-5

Inman Quits as House Panel Adviser

United Press International

Retired Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, one of America's top intelligence officers, said yesterday he had resigned as consultant to the House Intelligence Committee because it was politically partisan.

Inman, 51, who retired in April as deputy director of the CIA after serving as director of the supersecret National Security Agency and as deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, had agreed to serve as a nonsalaried consultant.

He told United Press International he had resigned because he was not consulted on a "seriously flawed" subcommittee report distributed

Sept. 22 that was critical of U.S. intelligence performance in Central America.

The subcommittee on oversight and evaluation was chaired by Rep. Charles Rose (D-N.C.).

"They didn't ask my views," Inman said.

Inman said that congressional oversight of the intelligence community "has to be bipartisan" and that the subcommittee's report, with emphasis on El Salvador, was "put out on party lines."

Inman said he announced his resignation Saturday, addressing the eighth annual convention of the Association of Former Intelligence Of-

ficers at a hotel in Springfield. Oversight of the intelligence agencies by the House and Senate intelligence committees, Inman said, has to be nonpolitical if it is to earn public credibility.

To avoid leaks, he said, "None of the staff should have any personal relations with the media. If this country doesn't establish a bipartisan approach to intelligence, we are not going to face the problems of the next 50 years."

Inman is highly regarded in the intelligence community, retiring as a four-star admiral. "Nobody can touch him," said one intelligence veteran. "He's tops."

Inman Asserts Panel Is Biased

WASHINGTON, Oct. 4 (UPI) — Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, one of the nation's top intelligence experts, said today that he had resigned his post as consultant to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence because the panel was politically biased.

Admiral Inman, a retired Navy officer who resigned as deputy director of Central Intelligence in April, said in an interview that he quit the House post because he was not consulted before the panel issued a paper on American intelligence activities in Central America.

"They didn't ask my views," he said. "I found the report seriously flawed."

Admiral Inman, who had been serving as a consultant to the Democratic-dominated House oversight panel, said

Congressional oversight of intelligence "has to be bipartisan" to merit credibility, but maintained that the committee's report, which focused on El Salvador and Honduras, was "put out on party lines."

He said that he announced his resignation in a speech Saturday night in Springfield, Va., to the eighth annual convention of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, and that he also wrote a letter to the committee chairman, Representative Edward P. Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts.

A committee spokesman said, however, that the panel "has received no communication from the admiral" on his resignation.

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ON PAGE 2

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
5 OCTOBER 1982

Admiral quits job, calls House panel too political

Washington

Retired Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, one of America's top intelligence experts, said he has resigned as consultant to the House Intelligence Committee because it is politically partisan.

Admiral Inman, who retired in April as deputy director of the CIA, said he resigned because he was not consulted on a "seriously flawed" subcommittee report that was distributed Sept. 22 and was critical of the performance of US intelligence in Central America.

Inman resigns as consultant

Retired Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, one of America's top intelligence officers, said yesterday he has resigned as consultant to the House Intelligence Committee because it was politically partisan.

Inman, 51, who retired in April as deputy director of the CIA after serving as director of the super-secret National Security Agency and as deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, had agreed to serve as a non-salaried consultant to the committee.

He told United Press International he resigned because he was not consulted on a "seriously flawed" subcommittee report distributed Sept. 22 that was critical of U.S. intelligence performance in Central America.

Inman said congressional oversight of the intelligence community "has to be bipartisan" and the subcommittee's report, with the emphasis on El Salvador, was "put out on party lines. It shouldn't be a party issue."

From Times News Services and Staff Reports

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UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
4 October 1982By DANIEL F. GILMORE
WASHINGTON

Retired Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, one of the nation's top intelligence experts, said Monday he has resigned his post as consultant to the House Intelligence Committee because the panel is politically biased.

Inman, who retired as deputy director of both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency in April, said in an interview he quit because he was not consulted before the committee issued a paper on U.S. intelligence activities in Central America.

"They didn't ask my views," he said. "I found the report seriously flawed."

Inman, director of the super-secret National Security Agency during his term with the CIA, has been serving as a consultant to the Democrat-dominated House oversight panel.

Inman, who left the CIA last April, said congressional oversight of intelligence "has to be bipartisan" to merit credibility, but the subcommittee report, which focused on El Salvador and Honduras, was "put out on party lines. It shouldn't be a party issue."

Inman said he announced his resignation during a speech Saturday night to the eighth annual convention of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers at a hotel in Springfield, Va.

He said he also wrote a letter to Rep. Edward Boland, D-Mass., chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.

A committee spokesman said, however, the panel "has received no communication from the admiral" on his resignation.

The spokesman said the committee never discussed consulting him on the report issued Sept. 22, to which he objected because it involved areas for which he had been responsible at the CIA, adding: "It would be unusual to ask him to consult on matters under his own stewardship at the CIA."

During his speech, Inman said "political tinkering" with the House intelligence oversight committee was the reason for his resignation.

To avoid leaks, he said, "None of the staff should have any personal relations with the media."

"If this country doesn't establish a bipartisan approach to intelligence, we are not going to face the problems of the next 50 years," he said.

Inman had kinder words for the Senate Intelligence committee, which has eight Republicans and seven Democrats and is chaired by Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz.

STATINTL

NEW YORK TIMES

1 OCTOBER 1982

Security of U.S. Said to Be Hurt By Data Leaks

Flow of Information to Soviet Found Harmful

By PHILIP M. BOFFEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30—A panel of experts appointed by the National Academy of Sciences has concluded that there has been "substantial and serious" leakage of American technology to the Soviet Union. The leakage included "a significant portion" that is "damaging to national security," the panel said in a report released today.

But the panel, which was given top-secret intelligence briefings, found that open scientific communications and ex-

Excerpts from report, page A11.

changes, particularly the activities of universities, played "a very small part" in the leakage.

It also warned that Government efforts to clamp down on the free flow of scientific information "could be extremely damaging to overall scientific and economic advance as well as to military progress."

'Damaging Transfers'

The head of the 19-member panel, Dr. Dale R. Corson, president emeritus of Cornell University, told a news conference that "these damaging transfers have occurred" through legal sales of products to the Soviet Union in periods of détente, through illegal sales of proscribed products, through transfers of American technology to the Soviet Union by third world countries and through "a highly organized espionage operation."

The report, entitled "Scientific Communication and National Security," does not give details on how any particular technology leaked to the Soviet Union was applied to military purposes.

But it cites intelligence estimates that the militarily significant technologies acquired by the Soviet Union and East European nations include such items as computer hardware and software, mirror technology suitable for laser weapons, advanced inertial guidance systems for missiles, jet engine designs, underwater navigation equipment and information on space satellite technology.

The panel's report thus gives support to both sides of an increasingly acrimonious debate between national security officials and the scientific community concerning the extent to which security restrictions should be applied to scientific knowledge.

"The panel has no reason to doubt," the report said, "Government assertions that such acquisitions from the West have permitted the Soviet military to develop countermeasures to Western weapons, improve Soviet weapon performance, avoid hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D costs, and modernize critical sectors of Soviet military production."

However, the panel said it had reached a "strong consensus" that "universities and open scientific communication have been the source of very little of this technology transfer problem." The panel said it had been shown "no documented examples" of national security damage from open scientific communications, and it expressed "serious doubt" that the Soviet Union could "reap significant direct military benefits" from the flow of scientific information "in the near term."

The group's central conclusion, emphasized in a news release accompanying its report, is that national security is more apt to be enhanced through a policy of open scientific communication that promotes scientific accomplishment rather than through a policy of secrecy controls that yield "limited and uncertain benefits."

The report was greeted warmly by George A. Keyworth 2d, President Reagan's science adviser, who said he found "very helpful the arguments that the report makes for security through accomplishment, rather than security through secrecy." He added: "The last thing we want to do is ape the repressive Soviet model, which stifles technological innovation through its obsession with secrecy."

The report was called "a good start" by Adm. Bobby R. Inman, former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who caused a furor in the scientific community by suggesting the need for voluntary restrictions on a wide range of research funding. He said the report agreed with his contention that there has been "substantial technology loss" and that research scientists should take a hand in attempting to prevent it. But he urged a follow-up study on industrial research, which he described as "a very major part of the problem."

The Defense Department simply said that the report "will provide an excellent opportunity for future dialogue."

STATINTL

Science Panel Says U.S. Shouldn't Classify Research Unless the Soviets Would Benefit

By ARLEN J. LARGE

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Representatives of the U.S. science establishment said the government should put a clear "classified" stamp on research that could benefit the Soviet Union, but otherwise shouldn't infringe on the normal free flow of world-wide discussion between scientists.

The recommendation came from a 19-member panel of the National Academy of Sciences. The panel's report was in response to a growing dispute between academic researchers jealous of their freedom to jawbone with each other about their work, and federal officials fearful that Soviet snoops will benefit from these papers and conversations.

The academy panel agreed with the government that Moscow has been gorging on advanced U.S. technology to the benefit of its military machine. But the panel said this has mainly occurred because of outright commercial sale of computers and other sophisticated hardware, legally or not, or because of thefts by Russian spies.

"There is a strong consensus," the panel said, "that universities and open scientific communication have been the sources of very little of this technology transfer problem." It said "security by accomplishment" in the nation's scientific laboratories was preferable to "security by secrecy."

Implications Spelled Out

At a news conference here yesterday, the panel's chairman, Dale Corson, professor emeritus of Cornell University, tried to spell out the report's implications.

"Where specific information has direct military relevance and must perforce be

kept secret," he said, "it should be classified strictly and guarded carefully. Most universities, however, will not accept classified research."

The academy's report comes at a time of tense relations between the Reagan administration and the academic science community, parts of which were already upset by proposed cuts in their research budgets. Last winter, then-deputy CIA director Bobby Inman warned at a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science that researchers might have to submit their findings to government censors before publication to prevent disclosures of military significance to the Soviets.

The tension sharply intensified in August at an international symposium of the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers in San Diego. With little warning, the Defense Department blocked presentation of more than 150 unclassified scientific papers, written under government grants, on the ground that Soviets and other foreigners would be present.

Olive Branch Extended

All this has produced a series of angry editorials in *Science* magazine, the main channel by which scientists talk to each other on policy matters. In an editorial last month entitled "Hand-Cuffing Science," publisher William Carey sharply criticized the "surprise strike" by the government in San Diego.

In an interview, yesterday, Mr. Carey said the academy's new report "is a useful start that could lead to tamping down the controversy." However, he characterized it as an "olive branch" being extended by organized science to the government, acknowledging the problem of giving away technology. He said the government now owes science an olive branch in return: "The controversy hasn't been closed," he said.

The Reagan administration appeared to accept the scientists' olive branch. George Keyworth, President Reagan's science adviser, said the report made some "very helpful" points. "The last thing we want to do is stifle technological innovation through obsession with secrecy," Mr. Keyworth said. "Still, there are some sensitive areas of research and technology where some control, short of security classification, is warranted."

Conciliatory Approach

Cornell's Mr. Corson, chairman of the academy's panel, said yesterday the Defense Department's "process was wrong" in the San Diego paper-suppressing incident. Otherwise, the group went out of its way to avoid seeming to be picking a fight with the administration. The study was financed in part by the Defense Department itself, and panel members got secret briefings by intelligence agencies on specific instances of technology leakage to the Soviet Union.

The panel said that in certain limited circumstances an unclassified, government-financed research paper could be submitted to the government for "modifications." But it also said the government shouldn't try to use export-control laws originally aimed at equipment shipments to suppress the exchange of scientific data, as has been attempted recently.

The National Academy of Sciences is a private group of top researchers in their fields, with a congressional charter to give the government advice on scientific matters.

Discussion called key to technological lead

WASHINGTON (AP)—There is little evidence that open scientific discussion hurts national security, and some government attempts to control information could hurt the country's technical progress, a National Academy of Sciences panel said Thursday.

The nation's technical lead may be better protected by continued research and discovery than by trying to restrict access to what is known, the special panel said.

However, the panel, which received several top-secret briefings during its study, reviewed evidence of technology lost to the Soviets and their allies and found the problem "substantial and serious."

The Soviets get most of this information through legal equipment purchases, outright espionage, illegal international trade and leaks from legal recipients abroad, it said.

But the investigation "failed to reveal specific evidence of damage to U.S. national security caused by information obtained from U.S. academic sources," it concluded.

THE SEVEN-MONTH study indicates only a "very small part" of the technology this country loses to the Soviet Union can be attributed to open scientific communication through meetings and publications.

The "limited and uncertain benefits" of controls are "outweighed by the importance of scientific progress, which open communication accelerates, to the overall welfare of the nation," said the Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy.

The group acknowledged there is a legitimate need to safeguard information, particularly technical expertise that can be applied to military design and production.

However, it said, this involves only a small amount of civilian research, and

the government should develop a consistent policy for such controls.

The controversy about government restrictions on research results, particularly from universities, has been growing for last five years.

THERE WERE repeated warnings from Adm. Bobby Inman, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and others that science-related security had to be tightened.

Despite protests from scientists, government agencies have restricted publication of papers, prevented presentations at meetings and restricted admittance of foreign scientists to the U.S.

Last month the Defense Department blocked presentation of almost 100 unclassified papers at an optical engineering meeting in San Diego. The department said some of the work might have military implications, and Soviet scientists attended the international meeting.

The academy study, chaired by Dr. Dale Corson, president emeritus of Cornell University, was sponsored by the Defense Department, the National Science Foundation and several scientific organizations. It was intended to find ways to resolve the controversy.

The panel recommended three guidelines it said would allow all but a small portion of government-funded, academically based research to continue without restrictions:

- The vast majority of university work should be unrestricted.
- In rare cases where research meets specific criteria, such as work with direct military application, it should get prior security classification.
- In the few "gray-area" cases, when there is potential but unproven military application, limited control may be justified. But these measures, such as restricting direct work by foreign scientists, should be specified by contract before the project begins.